We show that credit default swap (CDS) firms which are financially distressed are more likely to conduct acquisition investments, and experience higher announcement stock returns and credit rating upgrades around acquisitions. The positive effects of CDS on acquisition outcomes for these firms are attributable to their diversification and commitment benefits, and are more pronounced for CDS acquirers without empty creditors. Additionally, consistent with CDS increasing debt capacity, financially distressed CDS acquirers are more likely to conduct cash acquisitions. We address endogeneity concerns by employing the SEC's 2004 net capital rule exemption for broker-dealers as an exogenous shock to CDS markets.
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Over the last 20 years, a substantial fraction of the largest US listed firms have experienced the inception of credit default swap (CDS) contracts on their corporate debt.
1 Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that these contracts may affect the corporate activities of CDS reference firms (henceforth CDS firms). For example, Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that CDS firms have higher leverage and increased debt maturities; Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) provide evidence that CDS firms have higher bankruptcy risk; Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) demonstrate that CDS firms report accounting earnings less conservatively; and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2017) show that CDS firms hold higher cash balances.
2
Theoretical models (Bolton and Oehmke (2011), Campello and Matta (2016) , Darst and Refayet (2016) , Danis and Gamba (2017) , and Wong and Yu (2017) ) identify certain benefits from CDS resulting in higher debt capacity and positive effects for shareholders and creditors, which may, however, be outweighed by the threat of "empty creditors"; these are defined as "holders of debt and CDS who no longer have an interest in the efficient continuation of the debtor, and who may push the debtor into inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation" (Bolton and Oehmke (2011) ). Whilst this literature explores how CDS affect corporate investment decisions, there is a scarcity of empirical evidence on the subject.
3
Given that corporate investments constitute a setting in which agency conflicts may arise between shareholders and creditors, analyzing CDS in this context should provide useful insights on how such conflicts are either amplified or ameliorated. Drawing on the theoretical framework of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) , the main objective of this study is to empirically 1 A CDS is similar to an insurance contract on firm debt, whereby a debt protection buyer pays a periodic premium to a debt protection seller, who in the case of a credit event (such as debt-restructuring or liquidity default) will pay the buyer the difference between the nominal and market value of the firm debt. In June 2017, outstanding CDS contracts associated with non-financial firms stood at $2.66 trillion [Source: Bank for International Settlements (Semi-annual OTC derivative statistics, Table D5 . Commodity contracts, credit default swaps), https://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm accessed November 2017] . 2 For an extensive review of the CDS literature, see Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2016) . 3 In their review, Augustin et al. (2016) identify empirical testing of these theories as an important avenue for future CDS research.
examine how CDS affect corporate investments. This model predicts that financially distressed CDS firms will conduct more investments relative to financially distressed firms without CDS, via the channel of higher debt capacity, 4 with positive impacts for shareholder wealth and credit risk. However, the positive effects of CDS for financially distressed firms will be less pronounced in the presence of empty creditors.
We focus on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as the setting for our analysis, and investigate how CDS affects: i) firm propensity to undertake acquisitions; ii) acquirer shareholder wealth; and iii) acquirer credit risk. The reasons for focusing on M&As are fourfold. First, M&As represent the largest and most important corporate investments (Harford and Li (2007) ) that a firm can undertake, in which external financing is more prevalent than with capital expenditures (Elsas, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2014) ). Second, since M&As increase the credit risk of acquiring firms (Acharya and Johnson (2007) , Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) , and Furfine and Rosen (2011)), they provide a unique context for investigating the ex-ante and ex-post implications of the introduction of credit risk insurance. Third, acquisitions are more likely to intensify the inherent conflicts of interest among shareholders and creditors (Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) , Wang and Xie (2009), Bodnaruk and Rossi (2016) ), thus providing an ideal setting for exploring the effects of CDS on corporate investments through a modified agency relationship between firm stakeholders. 5 Fourth, acquisitions have identifiable announcement dates, which are critical to our research design and enable us to clearly identify wealth effects via event study analysis, thus facilitating our identification strategy.
We employ a comprehensive sample of US firms over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] to test our hypotheses. Our first empirical test provides strong support for the hypothesis that for financially distressed firms the presence of CDS significantly increases acquisition activity relative to financially distressed firms without CDS. In economic terms, financially distressed CDS firms are 13.55% more likely to conduct acquisitions relative to financially distressed firms without CDS. However, the higher propensity is not uniformly distributed across all financially distressed CDS firms, and consistent with Bolton and Oehmke (2011) , is driven by those firms which are not subject to the "empty creditor threat". The difference in acquisition propensity between those financially distressed CDS firms not affected by the empty creditor threat and those affected is a substantial 20.20%.
We also address potential concerns for our findings arising from both endogeneity and selection bias in CDS availability. Since acquisitions tend to increase credit risk, acquiring firms are more likely to have CDS initiated on their debt in the post-acquisition period giving rise to reverse causality concerns. 6 Furthermore, creditors with inside information on future acquisition plans may initiate CDS in advance of acquisitions (Acharya and Johnson (2007)) also giving rise to self-selection bias. Finally, unobserved omitted variables may drive both the presence of CDS and the decision to carry out acquisitions. To address these concerns, we employ the Heckman correction method along with a natural experiment-derived instrumental variable (IV) (Angrist and Krueger (1991) , Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens (2000) , and Angrist and Krueger (2001) ) in our models. In particular, we estimate a selection model for the probability of CDS trading on corporate debt, which allows us to construct the inverse Mills ratio and then adjust our baseline results for biases due to selection on unobservable variables (Heckman and Robb (1985) ). More specifically, we use an IV for CDS trading which is constructed upon an exogenous shock to investment banks' propensity to buy CDS protection. Our IV is based on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2004 net capital rule exemption, which allowed broker-dealers affiliated with major investment banks 6 'Credit Default Swaps Come in from the Cold', by Richard Barley, Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2014. to apply internal credit risk models, which recognized CDS contracts as valid hedges when computing capital requirements. This external intervention is very likely to have increased the CDS availability for firms that had relationships with these investment banks (Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2017) and Colonnello (2017)), without having any plausible reason to believe that it also affected acquisitions. We find that this IV is a highly significant predictor for the inception of CDS trading, assuring the instrument's relevance, and that our results remain robust after controlling for the potential selection bias and endogeneity of CDS trading.
Next, we examine the shareholder and creditor effects of acquisitions by financially distressed CDS firms, measured respectively with cumulative abnormal returns at acquisition announcement, and the change in credit rating between pre-and post-acquisition periods. We find that financially distressed CDS acquirers earn announcement stock returns that are 5.22% higher than financially distressed non-CDS acquirers, translating into a $258 million shareholder gain for a mean-sized financially distressed acquirer. These marginal gains to financially distressed CDS firms depend critically on the lack of empty creditors, which increases stock returns by 7.26%; this translates into an economically substantial $720 million value enhancement for a mean-sized financially distressed CDS acquirer. We find a similar pattern for credit rating effects, whereby financially distressed CDS acquirers are more likely to experience credit rating upgrades post-acquisition relative to financially distressed acquirers without CDS. This pattern again depends on the lack of empty creditor presence. The results hold after controlling for endogeneity concerns and are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) .
Finally, we show that the effects of CDS on acquisition investments are more pronounced for cash financed relative to stock financed acquisitions, consistent with the view that CDS facilitate credit capital market access and lead to increased firm debt capacity.
This paper makes several contributions to the growing literature on CDS and corporate finance outcomes (Saretto and Tookes (2013) , Subrahmanyam et al. (2014 ), Subrahmanyam et al. (2017 , Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) , Chava, Ganduri, and Ornthanalai (2017) , Colonnello et al. (2017) , and Colonnello (2017)), focusing particularly on M&As. First, it provides evidence that CDS are associated with real economic effects, by showing that CDS affect positively the acquisition propensity, shareholder wealth, and credit risk of financially distressed firms, and these effects are more pronounced when there is a lack of empty creditors, in support of the theoretical predictions of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) . This is important in light of prior empirical studies which, although documenting that CDS firms can raise more external funding, do not identify how this funding is used (Augustin et al. (2016) ).
In this respect, we more broadly contribute to the literature on the impact of credit market frictions on firm investment (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , Lemmon and Roberts (2010) , Denis and Sibilkov (2010), and Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012) ).
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Second, our findings contribute to the literature that examines the credit risk implications of M&As (Billett, King, and Mauer (2004) , Bessembinder et al. (2009 ), Furfine and Rosen (2011 ), and Deng, Kang, and Low (2013 ). This literature emphasizes that acquisitions lead to credit risk increases, whilst our results suggest that the level of financial distress, and the threat of empty creditors constitute important factors in determining whether acquisitions enhance or diminish the creditworthiness of acquiring firms.
Third, our study contributes to the literature that examines the impact of the separation between creditors' control and cash flow rights (and the associated effect on the relationship between creditors and debtors) on different corporate finance outcomes (Chava, and Roberts (2008) , Denis and Wang (2014 ), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009 ), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012 ), and Tan (2013 ). These studies examine how conflicts of interest between creditors and debtors affect various firm decisions and firm value. We provide evidence that CDS induced changes to the debtor-creditor relationship have a beneficial impact on the level of acquisition investments, shareholders' wealth, and creditors' risk. In this sense, the presence of CDS can reduce such conflicts of interest and the associated agency costs of debt.
Fourth, our study relates to the literature on the choice of method of payment in acquisitions and particularly to recent studies which show that higher (lower) debt capacity leads to higher (lower) use of cash (stock). For example, Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) and Uysal (2011) use distance from target debt ratio, whilst Karampatsas, Petmezas, and Travlos (2014) use credit ratings as a measure of debt capacity. We contribute to the understanding of the determinants of method of payment by showing that the presence of CDS has an independent positive impact on the likelihood of using cash.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the testable hypotheses. Section II describes the sample selection and data. Section III presents the empirical findings for the impact of CDS on acquisition propensity, acquirer announcement returns, and acquirer credit rating changes. Section IV presents the results for the impact of CDS on the choice of payment method. Finally, section V concludes the study.
I. Hypotheses Development

A. CDS and Acquisition Investments
In the work of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) the availability of CDS for financially distressed firms expands the set of available investment projects that can receive financing.
The unique channel for this positive effect is debt capacity, 9 which increases for the following two reasons:
(a) Diversification effect: By enabling CDS buyers to transfer credit risk to CDS sellers, CDS reduces creditors' exposure and their regulatory capital requirements, allowing them to extend more credit capital to reference firms (Duffee and Zhou (2001), Norden, Buston, and Wagner (2014) , and Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014)), which is referred to as the "diversification benefit" of CDS (Bolton and Oehmke (2011) incentivize financially distressed firms to exert greater effort towards wealth increasing economic outcomes, and induce these firms to commit ex ante to a lower probability of strategic default (Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and Danis and Gamba (2017) ). This may reduce the cost of debt (Kim (2016) and Danis and Gamba (2017) ) and increase debt capacity, which is referred to as the "commitment benefit" of CDS.
Therefore, we predict that financially distressed firms with CDS contracts are more likely to conduct acquisition investments relative to financially distressed firms without CDS contracts (Hypothesis 1a).
B. CDS and the Effects on Shareholders and Creditors
In the model of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) , the presence of CDS on financially distressed firms has mainly two distinct benefits for shareholders and creditors. First, CDS insurance allows financially distressed firms to relax their financial constraints and therefore undertake more positive NPV acquisition investments relative to financially distressed firms without CDS insurance, thus benefiting shareholders. Due to the additional positive NPV acquisitions, creditors will also be better off, since they will have higher collateral against their claims, thus also reducing their credit risk. In addition, acquiring firms are able to substitute expensive equity financing with cheap debt financing, thus increasing firm value
12 Relevant empirical studies demonstrate that in successful debt-restructurings, shareholders and creditors fare better than in bankruptcy filings, since in the former case both parties can share the benefits from the distribution of the renegotiation surplus (Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) , Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) , Franks and Torous (1994) , Betker (1995) , Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) , Chen and Strebulaev (2016), and Campello, Ladika, and Matta (2016) ).
(Danis and Gamba (2017)). 13 Second, the presence of CDS reduces the risk of strategic default (due to the commitment benefit), and hence increases the ex-ante value of these additional investment projects relative to financially distressed firms without CDS.
Therefore, we predict that financially distressed acquirers with CDS contracts are associated with improved shareholder wealth (Hypothesis 2a) and creditor effects (Hypothesis 3a) relative to financially distressed acquirers without CDS contracts.
C. CDS and the Role of Empty Creditors
The above theory does not, however, apply universally across all financially distressed firms with CDS. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) introduce a third effect (in addition to the diversification and commitment effects) stemming from the degree and type of available CDS insurance. More specifically, if during financial distress the CDS insurance designates a default payment that is proportionally high relative to both the creditors' loss in default and the associated renegotiation surplus, there exists a full separation of the creditors' control rights from their cash flow rights, which is referred to as "over-insurance". In this case, creditors retain their control rights but are fully hedged against the downside risk on the collection of their cash flow rights, thus becoming empty creditors. The creditors now have incentives to act so as to reduce the value of their debt claims by favoring bankruptcy over debt-restructuring strategies, even when the latter would be the most economically efficient choice, implying a misalignment of interests between shareholders-debtors and creditors.
That is, when the firm considers renegotiating its debt and the creditors are over-insured (i.e., empty creditors) against their debt claims, debt-restructuring cannot take place even when this strategy maximizes the total economic welfare. The rationale is that in this case the renegotiation surplus is the maximum the firm can offer to CDS protected creditors, which despite being positive and welfare enhancing is less than the designated CDS bankruptcy payment. Thus, empty creditors do not have the incentive to agree on a successful out-ofcourt debt-restructuring which would be beneficial for the survival of the firm as a going concern (Bedendo, Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2016) , and Danis (2016)). Thus, the combined acquisition benefits of CDS for financially distressed firms should be relatively higher (lower) when the renegotiation frictions are weakened (strengthened) due to the lack (presence) of empty creditors, implying higher (lower) propensity to undertake acquisitions (Hypothesis 1b), higher (lower) stock abnormal returns at the acquisition announcements (Hypothesis 2b), and enhancement (deterioration) of credit quality of the outstanding debt (Hypothesis 3b).
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II. Sample and Data
A. Sample Selection
Our (2017)). We identify the sample firms with available CDS and their inception date, by matching COMPUSTAT firms to Markit CDS firms using firm CUSIPs from the Markit RED entity files. We exclude firm-year observations for which there is no available Standard and Poor's (S&P) long-term debt rating, in order to reduce the statistical errors from the inclusion of unrated firms, and identify better the sample of firms that are most likely to be affected by the initiation of CDS. Based on the evidence in Saretto and Tookes (2013), the impact of CDS initiation on the increased credit supply is heterogeneous, and takes place 14 In practical terms, the renegotiation frictions depend on the ex-ante distribution of bargaining power between creditors and debtors, and are directly linked to the contractual terms of CDS contracts (Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) , Danis (2016) , and Colonnello (2017)), the different types of which are described in section II below.
through public-bond markets (public-debt markets), rather than through bank-loan markets (private-debt markets). Furthermore, Oehmke and Zawadowski ( (2015) and (2017)) document tighter links between CDS and bond markets rather than bank-loan markets. 15 In this respect, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) show that credit rating availability is a consistent measure for public-bond market access, and consequently rated firms have significantly more leverage compared to unrated firms. In the context of acquisition investments, Harford and
Uysal (2014) use the existence of credit ratings as an indicator for public-bond market access,
showing that rated firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions relative to unrated firms.
Therefore, we focus on all US publicly listed firms with available S&P long-term debt ratings, and exclude unrated firms to reduce noise in the analysis.
Following previous studies (see, for instance, Harford and Uysal (2014) require that the acquirer owns less than 50% of target shares prior to the acquisition announcement and seeks to acquire more than 90% after the deal. We also require that transactions are economically meaningful for acquirers, and thus that the deal value is above $1 million and the relative size (transaction value divided by acquirer market value four weeks prior to acquisition announcement) is at least 1%. This screening process identifies 2,730 acquisitions (1,103 of which are by 575 CDS unique acquirers) conducted by 858 unique acquirers.
B. Measure of Empty Creditor (Types of CDS Contracts)
As noted above, the availability of CDS contracts is associated with both positive (diversification and commitment), and negative (empty creditor) effects, and the net effect depends on the trade-off between these opposing effects. In order to disentangle the positive and negative effects, and estimate the net benefits of CDS that are unconfounded by the empty creditor problem, we exploit the heterogeneity in the contractual terms of the CDS contracts outstanding. excluded as a credit event, and hence we expect that XR-contracts will worsen the renegotiation frictions that are associated with the threat of empty creditors. In particular, CDS buyers with XR-contracts will not receive any insurance payments in the event of a debt-restructuring and will therefore strongly favor bankruptcy over debt-restructuring procedures in order to trigger CDS default payments.
C. Measure of Financial Distress
The literature Our financially distressed variable is an indicator variable that is equal to one for firms that belong to the highest quartile of the estimated first principal component, and zero otherwise. [Please Insert Table I About Here] We report summary statistics on control variables for the overall sample in Table II . The definitions are provided in the Appendix. Our sample is generally representative of previous studies.
[Please Insert Table II About Here]
III. Empirical Analysis
A. CDS and Acquisition Investments
We examine the relation between the presence of CDS and acquisition investments by estimating probit and tobit regression models and controlling for various firm-and industrycharacteristics, which prior literature has shown to determine acquisition investments. Table   III reports the results of this analysis. To mitigate reverse causality concerns and enhance predictive ability, all independent variables are lagged by one year. All regressions also control for year-and industry-fixed effects since acquisition activity varies across industry and time (see, for example, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005)). We opt not to employ firm-fixed effects for two reasons: a) The cross-sectional (between-firm) variation of CDS availability is substantially (3 times) larger than the time-series (within-firm) variation, and applying firm-fixed effects in this context runs the risk of producing inaccurate inferences. 20 b) Since we employ Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimators the inclusion of a large number of firm-fixed effects will induce an incidental parameters problem which can lead to inconsistent estimates (see Greene (2004) for a general discussion). 21 Moreover, we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted for firm level clustering to control for heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation of residuals. To ease interpretation we report marginal effects instead of regression coefficients.
In model (1) of Table 3 we run a probit regression where the dependent variable takes the value of one if the firm makes at least one acquisition in a given year, and zero otherwise. 20 See Roberts and Whited (2012), Section 7 for a general discussion of these issues; Zhou (2001) for a similar discussion in the case of managerial ownership; Bae and Goyal (2009) and thus the empty creditor threat loses its theoretical relevance and practical importance.
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As far as the remaining control variables, consistent with prior work, firms are more acquisitive when they have a low credit rating (credit rating level variable), high profitability, and high industry M&A volume, and less acquisitive when they are financially distressed and hold a high credit rating (credit rating level-squared variable). The effect of size on acquisition likelihood is negative, consistent with Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) and Aktas et al. (2017) who also use a sample of rated firms, but opposite to Harford and Uysal (2014). Thus, the effect of size differs for rated versus unrated firms.
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In model (2) we repeat the same exercise with a tobit regression where the dependent variable is the acquisition intensity that is censored at zero (see Harford and Uysal (2014) and 23 We note at this point that the motives for the introduction of CDS contracts for financially healthy firms are different than those for financially distressed firms, and are related with speculative (arbitrage) motives, and not with hedging motives (Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) and Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) ). An investigation of these effects is beyond the scope of this study. 24 We also perform a variance inflation factor test for multicollinearity and find that the correlation between the explanatory variables does not materially affect our estimates. Aktas et al. (2017) for a similar approach) and report unconditional marginal effects instead of tobit regression coefficients. 25 The dependent variable is the sum of acquisition deal values in a given year scaled by the firm's total assets during the previous year. The tobit regression allows us to investigate whether the probit results for the probability of conducting acquisitions translate also into the actual dollars spent for these acquisitions. The results are indeed highly consistent.
The coefficient of CDS*financially distressed has a large positive (2.34%) and marginally statistically significant effect at the 5% level, based on two-tailed z-test (marginally statistically significant at the 1% level based on one-tailed z-test), while the coefficient of financially distressed is negative (-0.82%) and statistically significant at the 5% level based on the two-tailed z-test from the regression models (statistically significant at the 1% level based on one-tailed z-test). In support of Hypothesis 1a, financially distressed CDS firms spend 3.16% more on acquisitions relative to financially distressed firms without CDS, and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level according to the values of the Chi-square test. The interaction variable CDS-XR*financially distressed carries a large negative (-2.80%), and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level. Therefore, financially distressed CDS firms spend 5.14% more on acquisitions relative to financially distressed CDS firms that are under the threat of empty creditors. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Overall, the results from the probit and tobit analyses provide evidence that are well aligned with the theoretical predictions of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and consistent with our Hypotheses 1a and 1b.
[Please Insert Table III About Here] 25 It is not possible to interpret the regression coefficients of a tobit model in the same way as the OLS coefficients. The tobit regression coefficients capture the marginal effect on the latent variable. To interpret the economic significance, we need to multiply the marginal effect with the probability that an observation becomes uncensored (implying that it becomes positive in our models) (see McDonald and Moffitt (1980) ).
B. CDS and Acquisition Investments: Endogeneity
The previous analysis is based on the assumption that the presence of CDS is exogenously determined. It is, however, possible that unobserved omitted variables may confound the relationship between CDS and acquisition investments, and induce a bias in our regression estimates. Moreover, CDS is more likely to be initiated when firms make acquisitions, as acquisitions are related with increases in leverage and credit risk (see, for example, Billett et al. (2004) , Bessembinder et al. (2009), and Furfine and Rosen (2011)) giving rise to reverse causality concerns. Furthermore, creditors with inside information on future acquisition plans may initiate CDS in advance of acquisitions (Acharya and Johnson (2007) ). In this case, self-selection bias emerges, producing unreliable estimates (Heckman (1979)). We address these concerns by using an IV that is derived from a natural experiment and apply the Heckman two-stage correction method throughout the rest of the paper.
In order to apply the Heckman two-stage approach, the choice of a valid instrument is critical. We require an instrument that satisfies two basic conditions: a) It is a random variable that is jointly independent both from the creditors' decisions to buy and sell CDS contracts, and from the firms' decisions to carry out acquisitions ("exclusion condition"); and b) It is a significant determinant of the creditors' decisions to buy and sell CDS contracts ("relevance condition") (Imbens and Angrist (1994) ). Instrumental variables that are derived from natural experiments are the best candidates towards these ends, since they can exploit exogenous government policies that can trigger environmental changes that are similar to a randomized experiment, and therefore satisfy the exclusion condition (Angrist and Krueger (2001) ). In that respect we exploit the SEC's 2004 net capital rule exemption for brokerdealers as a source of exogenous variation in CDS availability as in Colonnello et al. (2017) and Colonnello (2017) . The net capital rule was initiated in 1975 and is related with the haircuts that can be applied to the market value of the securities that different broker-dealers hold. The exemption to this rule was introduced in 2004 and authorized the largest brokerdealers to apply their own internal risk models in order to calculate their regulatory capital requirements.
The inception of this regulatory policy contains several features that render it an appropriate instrumental variable. First, the 2004 net capital rule exemption was exogenously introduced to the capital markets by the SEC's decision, and is arguably independent from both the lenders' decisions to buy and sell CDS contracts, and from the managers' decisions to carry out acquisition investments (thus satisfying the exclusion condition).
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Second, the 2004 net capital rule exemption allowed the use of several "credit risk transfer" (CRT) instruments for the calculation of capital requirements against derivativerelated credit risk, which included CDS contracts. This function of CDS contracts as a credit risk transfer tool that could be used to determine the broker-dealers' regulatory capital requirements has arguably contributed to an increased demand for CDS contracts from the broker dealers who could benefit from this net capital rule change. Moreover, this exemption did not apply uniformly to all broker-dealers, but only to those with "tentative net capital" of more than $5 billion that were categorised as "consolidated supervised entities" (CSEs), which included the five major U. While it can be argued that these instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction, since they cannot affect directly the main corporate outcome variables (leverage, bankruptcy and cash holdings), it can also be argued that these instruments are still determined endogenously by the creditors' decisions to buy and sell derivative contracts and/or to manage their capital ratios, and therefore cannot be considered akin to truly randomized assignments. We note however, that we have also considered lenders' foreign exchange hedging activities, and tier 1 capital ratios as instrumental variables. The CDS effect is also significant using these two instruments, although these variables are not our first choices for the reasons mentioned above.
Based on these arguments, our instrument for CDS availability is the indicator variable CSE relationship which takes the value of one when: a) a CSE has underwritten or extended loans to the sample firm in the previous seven years, and b) the SEC's net capital rule exemption was introduced in the capital markets (from 2004 onwards); and zero otherwise.
Given that the endogenous variable, CDS trading, is binary, we use the method proposed by Wooldridge (2002) In models (2) and (4) we report the probit selection models with the inclusion of
Pr(CDS) and Pr(CDS-XR)
as our instrumental variables and we also augment the models by controlling for year-fixed effects. In models (1) and (3) we have not included year-fixed effects, since the construction of the variable CSE relationship is strongly conditioned on the yearly introduction of the SEC's 2004 net capital rule exemption, and thus is highly correlated with year-fixed effects (multicollinearity bias). However, an attractive feature of Wooldridge's (2002) model specification is its flexibility in providing more degrees of freedom in terms of the exclusion restrictions that can be applied in the first-stage models. In that respect, we can initially avoid the multicollinearity problems in models (1) and (3) by excluding year-fixed effects, and consequently enhance the predictive ability of models (2) and (4) by including year-fixed effects, without sacrificing the statistical significance and precision of our instrumental variables. This is indeed the case, since in both models (2) and (4) the Pseudo R-squared values increase after the inclusion of year-fixed effects, and the
new instrumental variables Pr(CDS) and Pr(CDS-XR) satisfy the relevance condition, as long
as the values of the corresponding F-statistics are significantly large and well beyond the conventional threshold value of 10.00.
[Please Insert In Table V we present our baseline acquisition investment models after adjusting for endogeneity and selection bias with the Heckman correction method. Models (1) and (2) contain the same control variables as models (1) and (2) in Table III (2015) for a general discussion on how to deal with the endogeneity of nonlinear binary endogenous explanatory variables (EEV) (i.e., interaction terms) in applied econometrics. from 0 to 1), and compare them to the effects reported in Table III (untabulated) . In all the different scenarios, the coefficients of CDS*financially distressed and CDS-XR*financially distressed move further away from zero (CDS*financially distressed is more positive and CDS-XR*financially distressed is more negative), and the set of bias-adjusted coefficients does not contain a zero effect within its intervals. These results further attest to the robustness of our findings.
C. CDS and Acquirer Stock Abnormal Returns
In this section we examine the relation between CDS and acquirer announcement stock abnormal returns (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). We estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the five-day period (-2, +2) where 0 is the announcement day as in Golubov, Petmezas, 
D. CDS and Change in Acquirer Credit Risk
In this section we examine the association between CDS and acquirer changes in credit rating levels (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). ΔRating Level is the change in the acquirer's credit rating level over the period t-1 to t+1 (3-year period) where year t is the year of acquisition. Table VII presents the results of a second-difference ordered probit regression. Our specifications control for differences in firm characteristics that can affect the change in credit rating levels between the pre-and post-acquisition periods, such as changes in firm size, excess return, leverage, profitability, cash holdings, market-to-book, interest coverage, standard deviation of returns, volatility of profitability, convertible debt, capex, property, plant and equipment, and year-and industry-fixed effects.
30
The coefficient estimate of the variable CDS*financially distressed is positive and marginally statistically significant at the 5% level, based on two-tailed z-test (marginally statistically significant at the 1% level based on one-tailed z-test). This suggests that after controlling for changes in their characteristics, financially distressed CDS acquirers undertake deals that lead to improved credit ratings in the post-acquisition period. The coefficient for the variable financially distressed is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which implies that financially distressed acquirers conduct deals that lead to downgrades in the post-acquisition period. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, financially distressed CDS firms have a higher likelihood of experiencing credit risk improvements compared to financially distressed firms without CDS, and this is statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent with Hypothesis 3b, when the threat posed by the presence of empty creditors is not primary, financially distressed CDS firms have a higher likelihood of credit rating upgrades relative to financially distressed CDS firms that are under the threat of empty creditors, and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The impact of control variables is consistent with the literature. Acquirers experience improvements in their credit rating status when they are larger, have higher profitability, market-to-book value, cash holding, convertible debt and capital expenditures. On the other hand, acquirers experience deteriorations in credit ratings when they have higher leverage, idiosyncratic risk, and volatility in operating profitability.
[Please Insert Table VII About Here] Collectively, the results from sections III.C and III.D provide strong support for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b, indicating that the availability of CDS for financially distressed firms generates benefits for both shareholders and creditors, and that these benefits are most pronounced when the empty creditor threat is not a first-order concern for these firms.
IV. CDS and Cash versus Stock Acquisition Investments
Finally, in order to provide further insights for the validity of our hypotheses, we examine the impact of CDS on acquisition investments by taking into account the heterogeneity in the choice of payment method. Hypothesis 1a predicts that financially distressed firms with available CDS contracts are more likely to conduct acquisition investments relative to financially distressed firms without CDS contracts, and the main channel for this effect is increased debt capacity. It is generally known that firms with better debt capacity have a higher likelihood of using cash versus stock as the method of payment for acquisition, since these firms can access the credit markets more easily and negotiate their debt contracts under favorable terms (Martin (1996) Hypothesis 1b since we expect financially distressed CDS firms to benefit from increased debt capacity (due to diversification and commitment benefits), and therefore to be more likely to use cash versus stock as the method of payment.
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In Table VIII we present the results of an ordered probit regression model in which the dependent variable equals zero for no acquisition, one for 100% stock-financed acquisitions, and two for 100% cash-financed acquisitions. The variable CDS*financially distressed is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, based on two-tailed z-test (statistically significant at the 5% level based on one-tailed z-test), while the variable CDS-XR*financially distressed is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level based on two-tailed z-test.
Therefore financially distressed CDS firms have a substantially higher likelihood of conducting cash acquisitions relative to financially distressed firms without CDS.
Additionally, in the absence of empty creditors financially distressed CDS firms have a substantially higher likelihood of undertaking cash acquisitions relative to financially distressed CDS firms which are under the threat of empty creditors, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with CDS generating benefits through the enhanced debt capacity of CDS referenced firms, and further attest to the validity of Hypotheses 1a and 1b.
[Please Insert 
V. Conclusion
This study investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) in the context of corporate acquisitions. Consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model of Bolton and Oehmke (2011), we provide evidence that financially distressed rated firms with available CDS contracts are more likely to conduct acquisition investments relative to financially distressed rated firms without available CDS contracts, which we attribute to a CDS related increase in debt capacity due to diversification and commitment benefit effects. We also show that there are negative effects associated with the introduction of CDS contracts for financially distressed firms when the threat of empty creditors is a primary concern for these firms. Additionally we show that financially distressed acquirers with available CDS experience higher announcement stock returns and higher credit ratings as compared to financially distressed acquirers without available CDS, and that these positive effects are more pronounced when the threat of empty creditors is a not primary concern for these acquirers. All these results hold after we address endogeneity concerns by using an exogenous shock to CDS markets. Finally, we find that financially distressed firms with available CDS are more likely to undertake cash acquisition investments, which again supports the notion that CDS increase debt capacity.
Overall, the results presented in this study indicate that CDS contracts are not redundant securities, but instead have real economic effects. Additionally, our findings have important implications for the policy debate on the broader welfare effects of the CDS market. In particular, it has been suggested that the increase in leverage associated with CDS (Saretto and Tookes (2013)) may not result in welfare benefits if it leads to inefficiently high precautionary cash holdings rather than an increase in investment (Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) ). The evidence from this paper suggests that the availability of CDS is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, in the absence of empty creditors, financially distressed firms with available CDS undertake more acquisition investments that pay off for both shareholders and creditors. On the other hand, in the presence of empty creditors, financially distressed firms with available CDS undertake fewer acquisition investments that impair the wealth of shareholders and creditors. Therefore, despite recent criticism against CDS, our results do not justify indiscriminate policy restrictions on the use of all CDS contracts, but rather these policies should be eclectic and discriminate well the positive from the negative effects of CDS before their actual implementation.
Appendix A. Variable Definitions Dependent Variables
Acquisition likelihood: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least one acquisition in year t, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC.
Acquisition intensity:
The sum of the deal values of all completed acquisitions announced in year t scaled by the firm's total assets in year t-1. Deal values are from Thomson Financial SDC, total assets are from COMPUSTAT. Only transactions larger than 1% of market equity are included in the sample.
Acquirer CARs: Cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm over the 5-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement day. The returns are calculated using the market model with the market model parameters estimated over the period between 240 and 41 days prior to the announcement. The CRSP value-weighted index return is the market return.
ΔRating level:
The rating level change between year t+1 and year t-1 where year t is the year of the acquisition.
Firm Variables
CDS:
Binary variable for CDS reference firms from Markit that takes the value of 1 if the firm has CDS, 0 otherwise.
CDS-XR:
Binary variable for CDS reference firms from Markit that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a No-Restructuring (XR) clause on its CDS contracts outstanding, 0 otherwise.
Financially distressed:
Binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm belongs to the highest quartile of the estimated 1 st principal component score that is based on three measures: a) Altman (1968) score; b) Zmijweski (1984) score; and c) Shumway (2001) score, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from COMPUSTAT.
Credit rating level: Continuous variable for rated firms from COMPUSTAT which takes the value from 1 (D rating) to 22 (AAA rating). The ratings are the Standard and Poor's ratings.
Credit rating level
2 : The squared term of the credit rating level variable.
Size: Firm total assets at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT in US$ millions deflated using the CPI index with the base year 2001. The regressions use the natural log of this variable.
Excess stock return:
The annualized market adjusted return (using the value-weighted CRSP index as benchmark).
Leverage: Total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets. The variable is created using data from COMPUSTAT.
Relative size: Ratio of the deal value to the market capitalization of the acquiring firm four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. The variable is created using data from SDC and CRSP.
Industry Variables
Herfindahl index: Sum of squares of the market shares of all firms in a given year and threedigit SIC industry, where market share is defined as sales of the firm divided by the sum of the sales in the industry. The variable is created using data from SDC and COMPUSTAT.
M&A liquidity: Sum of acquisitions made in a given year and three-digit SIC code industry, divided by the sum of total assets of all COMPUSTAT firms with the same three-digit SIC code.
Instrumental Variables
CSE relationship: Binary variable that takes the value of 1 in a given firm-year if a (consolidated supervised entity (CSE) has underwritten or extended loans to the firm after the SEC's 2004 net capital rule exemption, and zero otherwise. The variable is created using data from SDC.
Table I Credit Default Swap (CDS), Non-Credit Default Swap (Non-CDS), CDS-XR Firms and Acquisition Activity by Year
This table presents the annual number and proportion of CDS, non-CDS, and CDS-XR firms and their acquisition activity for the universe of US rated publicly listed firms over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . Column (2) displays the number of unique firms in the sample. Column (3) shows the number of acquisitions. Columns (4), (6), and (8) show the proportion of CDS, non-CDS, and CDS-XR firms, respectively. Columns (5), (7) and (9) [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . Column (1) presents marginal effects of a probit specification and column (2) unconditional marginal effects of a tobit specification. The dependent variable in the probit model takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least one acquisition exceeding 1% of the market value of its equity in year t, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the tobit model is the ratio of the sum of all acquisitions exceeding 1% of the market value of equity announced by a firm in year t, divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. The explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All models include year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (2)), and the availability of CDS-XR contracts (columns (3) and (4)) on corporate debt for all US publicly listed firms with available credit ratings over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . CSE relationship is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 in a given firm-year if a CSE has underwritten public debt or extended loans to the firm after the SEC's 2004 net capital rule exemption, and zero otherwise. In line with the method proposed by Wooldridge (2002) , the fitted probabilities of CDS (column (1)) and CDS-XR (column (3)) are then used as instruments for CDS and CDS-XR in columns (2) and (4), respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All models (unless stated otherwise) include either year or industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . Column (1) presents the marginal effects of the probit specification, while column (2) presents unconditional marginal effects of a tobit specification. The dependent variable in the probit models takes the value of one if the firm announced at least one acquisition exceeding 1% of the market value of its equity in year t, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the tobit models is the ratio of the sum of all acquisitions exceeding 1% of the market value of equity announced by a firm in year t, divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. The explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All models include year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . Column (1) presents the estimated coefficients of an ordered probit specification. The dependent variable takes the value of zero for no acquisitions, the value of one for 100% stock-financed deals, and the value of two for 100% cash-financed deals. The explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The model includes year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed and are based on calendar year and three-digit SIC code industry classification dummies, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
